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Background
In very recent years, the topic of occupational diseases has 
become a subject of discussion at the various conferences 
and seminars that are held on workers' compensation. This 
reflection of the considerable interest in the adequacy of the 
state workers' compensation systems in terms of diseases 
associated with the workplace represents a dramatic change 
from the disinterest in the subject that characterized the 
period before the mid-1970s. The reasons for the remarkable 
growth in attention to this subject need not occupy us here. 
What is of interest, however, is that the context of these 
discussions seems to be, invariably, the problems and dif 
ficulties of providing a sound, adequate and fair public pro 
gram to compensate victims of such disabling and killing 
diseases. In the presence of such widespread concern, much 
discussion has focused upon efforts to reform workers' com 
pensation. The purpose of this essay is to describe the essen 
tial questions that potential reformers must resolve as they 
design alternative mechanisms that seek to improve the func 
tioning of the compensation system. Most of the efforts to
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broadly change occupational disease compensation have not 
been successful. This failure is partly due to the complexity 
of these questions and to the broader implications of the 
possible answers.
Efforts to reform occupational disease compensation can 
not be analyzed in vacuo. Beginning in about 1969, a variety 
of steps were taken that were designed to fundamentally alter 
the nature of state workers' compensation laws. In the wake 
of the Farmington, West Virginia coal mine disaster, Con 
gress enacted the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act that year. 
Title IV of the law dealt with the widely perceived inability of 
state laws to compensate victims of coal workers' 
pneumoconiosis by creating a federal compensation pro 
gram, with coverage ostensibly limited to a single disease, for 
a single occupation, and with eligibility limited in several im 
portant respects. For example, benefits were to be paid only 
for death or permanent total disability, thereby totally ex 
cluding any direct involvement with temporary disability or 
partial disability.
The Black Lung program initially attempted to split up 
compensation by paying benefits out of federal general 
revenues to victims with "old cases," and by turning over to 
the states newly developing cases after a short period of tran 
sition. The law was significantly amended in 1972, 1977 and 
1981. For our purposes, it is sufficient to observe that it has 
become a permanent federal program, one whose presence 
serves as a constant reminder of federal activity in the 
workers' compensation field.
The second major impetus for reform in that era was the 
Report of the National Commission on State Workmen's 
Compensation Laws issued in 1972. The Commission owed 
its existence to Section 27 of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970. More specifically, it was the product of 
several persons in the Congress who believed that such a
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body would unlock the gates that historically had kept the 
federal government out of the domain of state compensation 
systems (Black Lung aside). It is a mark either of this group's 
optimism, or of its total frustration born of an inability to 
breech these gates till then, that its hopes rested with an 
essentially conservative Commission appointed by President 
Richard Nixon.
The Commission found many areas in need of overhaul. 
Of its 84 recommendations for reform, 19 were deemed to be 
essential ones. Most significant for our needs, the Report 
urged the states to act as soon as possible to clean up their 
laws and to comply at least with the "essential recommenda 
tions." Issued on July 1, 1972, the Report added that the 
Congress should step in and act if the states had not com 
plied (at least broadly, presumably) by July 1975. The Com 
mission supported the principle that the Congress should im 
pose a set of minimum standards on each of the states if 
there was a lack of compliance with the "essential recom 
mendations" in the three years. The 19 recommendations 
were the key to the potential standards.
It is instructive to observe the reform experience since July 
1972. Clearly, no federal legislation of any sort dealing 
directly with state workers' compensation laws has come 
close to congressional passage. State-by-state progress has 
not been the cause of federal inaction. While many states did 
enact legislation since 1972 that moved them closer to the 
Commission's goals, the average state still meets only about 
two-thirds of the "essential recommendations." The hope 
that states would largely comply of their own accord by July 
1975, obviating the need for federal minimum standards, has 
clearly not been met. What factors explain this apparent in 
ability to achieve full-scale reform, either through voluntary 
state action or by the federal government?
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At the state level I would point to several developments 
that made full compliance with the "essential recommenda 
tions" particularly difficult to achieve. First, the reforms 
were seen as being expensive, thereby raising insurance costs 
to employers. Such increases were difficult for state 
legislatures to justify in the decade following the Commis 
sion's Report, when state unemployment rates were reaching 
and holding levels not experienced since the outbreak of the 
Second World War. Interstate competition for jobs made 
such reforms unattainable on a state-by-state basis.
Many states did at least partially implement some reforms, 
and a number of these changes led to higher employer com 
pensation costs. These changes, occurring as system utiliza 
tion expanded, served to place limits on the extent of reform 
by the various states. The unexpected cost increases even led 
some advocates of the "essential recommendations" to 
withdraw their support of them.
At the federal level, efforts to enact minimum standards 
failed even more completely. The same fears about costs, 
particularly in the economically stagflated environment of 
the 1970s and early 1980s, contributed to congressional inac 
tion. That aside, three other factors in particular deserve 
some note, though the list of the causes of failure is longer 
than this. First, any effort to enact federal legislation must 
contend with the various interest groups that have developed 
within the states during the decades that these programs ex 
isted. The issue goes beyond simply the reluctance to accept 
change by those individuals and organizations accustomed to 
earning a living from the compensation system. It is the sheer 
number of such groups and the inability to fashion com 
promises when so many parties have a stake that makes any 
federal reform legislation so difficult to achieve. Recall that 
substantial clout can rest with not only labor and manage 
ment, but that it may reside also with state administrators, 
the plaintiff and defense bars, several elements within the in-
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surance industry, the health professions, municipal officials 
and others. This is not to suggest that this kind of numbers 
problem exists solely when federal reform efforts emerge. It 
also exists as a problem when efforts for reform are made at 
the state level.
A second source of difficulties is the nature of the stan 
dards that can be administered by the federal government. It 
is quite apparent that those types of standards that are quan 
tifiable are simpler to set, easier to target on for states, and 
less likely to be controversial when their compliance is 
evaluated. By contrast, a variety of possible standards in 
volving a qualitative character would pose considerable dif 
ficulty in monitoring for a federal agency. As an example, 
employers and insurers that might be attracted to some 
federal involvement as a means of achieving reform often 
speak of the need for an improved "delivery system" in 
workers' compensation. Whatever is meant by this, it 
represents a qualitative sort of change that the federal 
government is not well equipped to impose on the states. 
Consequently, the relative ease of raising benefit levels, and 
the difficulty of assuring a better delivery system, have 
meant that orchestrating compromises aimed at legislating 
federal standards are necessarily harder to achieve.
The greatest stumbling block en route to any federal 
minimum standards has been the inability to find a 
mechanism whereby the federal government can enforce 
compliance. The experience under OSHA and Black Lung 
apparently have left many persons somewhat wary of "tem 
porary" federal takeovers of existing state programs. Since 
there is no existing federal support of state compensation 
agencies or programs, the threat of a withdrawal of federal 
government monies has no meaning for the states. Moving 
claims into the already overburdened federal courts from 
state agencies or courts is also highly problematic.
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Behind all these difficulties is the obvious aversion of Con 
gress to making workers' compensation a federal program. 
It is hard to believe that the widespread extent of this view in 
Congress does not derive, in part at least, from the problems 
encountered in administering the three federal workers' com 
pensation programs, Black Lung, the Longshore and Harbor 
Workers' Act and the Federal Employees Compensation 
Act. These programs serve as a constant reminder that 
nothing guarantees that a federal compensation program will 
operate more effectively than a state program.
The Need for Reform 
in Occupational Disease
While a large variety of potential reforms have been pro 
posed, the most frequently cited ones are relatively few. Sur 
prisingly, there appears to be little disagreement among most 
of the parties about the nature and the desirability of these 
most obvious areas of reform. This is not to minimize the 
differences of views when one leaves the general for the 
specific, nor the reluctance of the parties to hold back their 
endorsement of reforms as part of a bargaining strategy. In 
stead, this is to suggest that the substance of the reforms that 
have been and will be proposed are well understood.
There exist a variety of limitation rules in some state laws 
that can serve to bar otherwise obviously worthy claims. As 
such, they render affected workers or survivors unprotected 
under this social insurance program. Such rules take several 
forms. One such barrier requires that a claim be filed within 
some time period after the last workplace exposure to the 
source of the disease. A second sort of unrealistic require 
ment might deny eligibility unless the worker has been 
employed and exposed to the hazard for at least a minimum 
specified and arbitrary period of time. The limitation may be 
medically unsound, having no justification in terms of how
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the disease is contracted. A third barrier involving timing 
may require that a claim be filed within a relatively short 
period of time subsequent to the development of the disease, 
even if the worker is not immediately disabled by the illness 
or aware of its presence. Such statutes of limitation may also 
bar claims from survivors who are not immediately aware of 
the work-relatedness of the killing disease.
A second cluster of barriers arises from the character of 
workers' compensation historically, as a mechanism for 
dealing with injuries caused by accidents. Such limitations 
have made it more difficult to receive compensation, and 
have even eliminated the possibility where the claimant could 
not demonstrate that an "accident" gave rise to the disabili 
ty. Related to such barriers has been the denial of claims 
where a disease is thought to be an "ordinary disease of 
life," providing the claimant with little or no opportunity to 
prove that the specific instance was work-caused.
Another area in need of change involves the benefit struc 
ture. It is hardly possible to justify differential benefits for 
victims of industrial injuries and diseases, either in terms of 
compensation or medical-health treatment. It is also difficult 
to justify benefit payments for workers or survivors that are 
based on earnings levels at the time of (last) exposure, when 
the disease develops one or two decades later. The combina 
tion of inflation and productivity gains render such 
historically-based benefit levels hardly worthy of the extend 
ed and costly controversy that can follow the filing of a 
claim.
Another set of problems that is widely acknowledged to 
exist for certain claimants involves the burden of proof need 
ed to sustain a claim. It is not possible in so short a space to 
indicate the myriad difficulties that (potential) claimants 
may have in establishing what hazard caused the disease, or 
that the disablement or death from disease arose out of and
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in the course of employment. In many instances the problem 
of proof relates even to the diagnosis of the impairment. 
This was the foremost issue that led to the passage of the 
Black Lung law, and this remains a central problem in claims 
for asbestosis and byssinosis.
Problems in Reforming 
Occupational Disease Compensation
Earlier in this paper a number of reasons were cited as to 
why workers' compensation reform efforts have en 
countered difficulties and why no federal legislation has been 
adopted of the sort recommended by the National Commis 
sion on State Workmen's Compensation Laws. All of these 
reasons exist as well, and impede progress toward reform in 
occupational diseases. Additionally, a variety of other prob 
lems exist that must be resolved if the process of reform is to 
be successful. In this section of the paper four sets of issues 
on which there is little agreement are described. They are 
treated in the context of possible federal legislation.
A. Coverage Issues
Any attempt to reform workers' compensation for oc 
cupational diseases immediately confronts issues of equity, 
costs and politics as it relates to coverage. At one pole are 
those proposals that would specify a single disease, or set of 
diseases attributable to a single hazard, or a single occupa 
tion or industry as the target of legislation. The advantages 
of so narrow a focus are thought to be political. By strictly 
limiting coverage in some such a manner, the costs of such a 
program will likely be more modest, an unambiguous virtue 
in an era of governmental austerity, at least as it might affect 
new programs. The other principal political virtue is that 
narrow and tightly bounded programs are seen as less 
threatening in the long run to those who advocate the reten-
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tion of fully state-controlled workers' compensation 
systems.
The most obvious disadvantage of such narrow coverage is 
the inability to provide horizontal equity (equal treatment of 
equals) to those not covered. For example, the same disease 
that is compensable to a worker who loads a train with coal 
at a mine may not be compensable under the federal law for 
the worker unloading it at the electric utility or steel mill. 
How does one justify compensating an insulation worker 
with lung cancer but not a worker with the same disease who 
was formerly employed on the top side of a coke oven? The 
answer, clearly, is based primarily on the pragmatic assess 
ment of what might get through the U.S. Congress, and not 
on the disparate excesses in standard mortality rates for the 
two groups of employees.
At the other pole in terms of proposed coverage are the 
schemes that would pull all occupational disease cases out of 
existing state workers' compensation systems and put these 
under some federal program. This proposal also violates the 
principle of horizontal equity, as it differentiates between 
workers with work-caused injuries being covered by the dif 
ferent state programs, leaving those with diseases subject to 
the federally determined criteria for eligibility and benefits.
Far more problematic is the question of how and where 
the line is drawn between disease and injury. It takes almost 
no effort to identify the many areas of ambiguity that arise 
when one seeks to cover all occupational diseases with a 
separate statute. In which grouping would one place the 
disabilities resulting from cumulative trauma? Are "back 
cases" instances of injury or disease? Where would hearing 
loss cases fit? Even where these grey areas are anticipated by 
the drafters of a statute, what logical criteria would they 
employ so as to explicitly place a category of harms under or 
outside of coverage? A wealth of experience exists to suggest
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that no reasonable degree of foresightedness will be suffi 
cient to prevent considerable litigation and uncertainty from 
arising over the issue of the appropriate jurisdiction for 
specific cases.
Somewhere between these polar positions on coverage is 
the one whereby the statute would cover only one or two 
diseases initially, but would allow for possible expansion 
subsequently, without the need of new legislative action. An 
approach of this sort, as found in Congressman Miller's pro 
posed bill, has the apparent political virtue of compromising 
between those who would support occupational disease 
reform legislation only if coverage were very limited and 
specific, and those who would opt for very wide if not all- 
inclusive coverage. By initially moving only asbestos-caused 
(work-connected) diseases to the federal arena, but leaving 
open the possibility of future expansion of coverage of other 
specific classes of disease, the question of appropriate 
coverage is not eliminated but is simply transferred to a less 
direct and obvious position.
Once one allows for possible future enlargement of scope, 
the subsidiary issues begin with determining who shall decide 
when and if coverage is to be broadened. Shall it be the 
Secretary of Labor, the head of an autonomous commission, 
the National Institute of Health? Presumably, congressional 
veto will not be available to assure those who fear that deci 
sions about future expansion could run amok if left ex 
clusively in the hands of the executive branch. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has made this sort of assurance useless. In 
any case, the core of the question is, shall the expansion of 
future coverage be primarily in the hands of scientists and 
health professionals, or will it be left to those more sensitive 
to the political winds. One could design such a scheme where 
both types have an input, but one cannot avoid confronting 
the final step of some such process where it will be either the 
politicians or the epidemiologists who must decide.
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Aside from the question of who shall decide what future 
coverage will be, a number of secondary questions must also 
be faced in preparing such reform legislation. Given some 
decision about who shall decide, one has to define what 
possible issues can be considered. For example, suppose the 
Secretary of Labor is given the responsibility to decide what 
new coverage may be. Would the Secretary be empowered to 
consider specific areas based solely on his/her own discre 
tion? Could others force the Secretary to review certain 
issues? Could anyone block the Secretary from considering 
the review of possible areas of extension? Would the same 
rules apply for expanding coverage as for cutting it back? To 
what extent would possible expansion parallel the protracted 
and litigation-filled model of the OSHA standard-setting 
process?
Behind all these questions is the accumulated experience of 
all the interest groups in dealing with the federal government 
in the areas of workers' compensation and in occupational 
health. From the vantage point of organized labor, there is 
the frustration of not having been able to get any sort of 
federal involvement in state workers' compensation pro 
grams (Black Lung aside). Additionally, there is a sense that 
OSHA standards have been too few, too slow and difficult 
to develop, and too timid. All the parties are aware also, that 
since the passage of OSHA in 1970, the law has not been 
amended at all. For labor this suggests that the need is to do 
more than to pass a marginally acceptable piece of legislation 
with the hope of accomplishing one's basic goals in subse 
quent amendments.
From the vantage point of industry, the asbestos sector 
aside, there is considerable concern about the federal govern 
ment's possible expansion into broader areas of disease. The 
Black Lung experience is repeatedly cited as an example of 
politics dominating sound judgment. The extent to which 
Congress allowed the program to expand in the 1972 and
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1977 amendments serves as a red flag to those who would 
prefer either no federal role in occupational disease or a nar 
rowly defined one with no opportunity to widen it.
A different question regarding coverage that any reform 
must tackle is the range of exigencies for which benefits can 
be paid. While most proposals call for benefits to survivors 
in deaths from occupational disease, as well as benefits for 
permanent total disability, there is less agreement among 
supporters of reform beyond this. Potential areas for 
benefits include "medical only," temporary disabilities, and 
permanent partial disability. If a federal occupational 
disease bill provides coverage for any of these, the ad 
ministrative burdens become far greater as the potential 
number of claimants is much larger in any of these categories 
than in death or permanent total disability. Further, com 
pensating permanent partial disabilities can be especially dif 
ficult, whether it be for diseases or for injuries. If one takes 
the expedient route and does not cover such cases, however, 
serious problems develop in aligning the federal and the state 
programs where jurisdiction is based on subjective and wide 
ly varying estimates of the extent of impairment or disability.
A final question of coverage that needs resolution is the 
treatment of "old cases." Specifically, to what extent would 
a new federal reform law seek to deal with deaths and 
disabilities that occurred in earlier years? By covering such 
old cases, one is assured both that the costs will be higher 
and that problems of available evidence and proof become 
more complicated. Organized labor seems adamantly com 
mitted to having old cases covered.
If one decides to cover old cases, are all cases formerly 
under state jurisdiction to be opened or reopened? The 
Miller bill opts for some compromise by extending coverage 
to old cases only where no benefits have been previously 
paid. The potential for problems and for questions of equity
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are too numerous to detail, but some must be noted. For ex 
ample, suppose a worker had earlier received a "medical on 
ly" benefit through the state law, but was denied any 
benefits at a later date when claiming to be permanently and 
totally disabled. Suppose a worker received $500 for a tem 
porary total disability. If the worker later dies, allegedly 
from the disease, will the survivor be able to claim federal 
benefits when state benefits are denied in the death claim?
B. Medical Issues
Once the questions of coverage are decided, a variety of 
issues emerge regarding eligibility. Specifically, aside from 
any potential federal legislation operating without the ar 
tificial barriers to compensation that have existed in some of 
the states, what would make a federal program more accessi 
ble to claimants than some of the state systems? Essentially, 
the answer would have to be that more rational or 
manageable (from the applicant's view) standards of 
evidence be required in such claims than exist currently.
Several sorts of changes are likely under any federal 
reform. Most likely there would be some resort to presump 
tions that would ease the claimant's evidentiary burden. 
While the presence of presumptions seems likely to be found 
in almost any reform proposals, a host of questions about 
them needs to be resolved before incorporating them in new 
legislation. Just as in the case of coverage, support for 
reforms will hang on how these are answered.
The most significant questions parallel those raised about 
coverage. Are presumptions to be limited to what is placed in 
the original statute, or is there some way of adding to or 
modifying them administratively? Who is to determine what 
the presumptions are to be, who can initiate the process of 
changing them, what is the process to be of setting them, and 
what challenges to them will be permitted? Are presumptions
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to be limited to medical issues and exposure questions? Can 
the presumptions be rebutted or not? The constitutionality 
of an irrebuttable presumption has been upheld, but the 
clamor over the single one found under Black Lung has 
never subsided. In the presence of rebuttable presumptions, 
the administrative agency will likely determine in the regula 
tions that it sets, precisely how academic it may be to seek to 
rebut. One possibility is that rebuttable presumptions are de 
facto impossible to rebut. Alternatively, they may be written 
in such a way that they are of little help to the claimant. In 
large measure, this issue depends upon whether it is a 
government agency that is in a position to rebut an invoked 
presumption, or if it is a private sector employer or insurer 
that is defending the claim.
A second set of health issues involves the use of medical 
panels. To what extent is it appropriate to use such panels of 
objective and technically qualified experts in cases where 
there is some dispute about a medical question? One of the 
most controversial issues that arose under Black Lung was 
the use made by the government of "B" readers to evaluate 
the quality of and diagnoses from chest X-rays.
There are three basic sets of medical problems that may 
arise in occupational disease claims. Disputes about them are 
not equally well dealt with by impartial medical persons. 
Questions of diagnosis are probably the best ones to be set 
tled by such specialists. Issues relating to etiology are prob 
ably much less amenable to resolution by a panel. The third 
area depends upon the principle of compensation used by the 
agency in question. Medical panels are ideal for settling 
disputes regarding the extent of impairment, but they are not 
at all suited to deciding whether the claimant's degree of 
disability has been fairly assessed.
Aside from issues of how to use such experts, questions 
arise regarding their selection, remuneration and tenure. Ad-
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ditionally, some decisions must be made about the ability of 
the parties in a claim to challenge the findings of such ex 
perts.
C. Financing Issues
Any federal occupational disease legislation that goes 
beyond simply requiring the states to meet certain standards 
implies that a new financial obligation will be incurred by 
some party or other. The need for new funding sources is 
especially significant where old cases are to be covered. 
Presently, there appears to be a universal antipathy to having 
this burden fall on the U.S. Treasury, as was done in the case 
in the Part B segment of Black Lung.
A variety of possible options have been weighed. On one 
side are those who wish to apply some variant of experience 
rating to a funding scheme so as to make only "responsible 
employers" pay where their employees developed disease. 
Such an approach has appeal to those who view this as fur 
thering the safety and health goals of a compensation system 
through the use of appropriate incentives. This sort of fund 
ing plan also satisfies the needs of some who want to mete 
out punishment to responsible employers. A variation of 
this, as found in the Miller bill, would seek needed funding 
from an entire industry but not try to establish who the 
responsible employer was on a case-by-case basis, nor 
employ any experience rating at the level of the firm.
There are several grounds for objection to either of these 
funding approaches. The experience under the Black Lung 
Act demonstrated the enormity of the task of identifying 
responsible employers, particularly in older cases. Alleged 
responsible parties challenged and fought almost every single 
old case attributed to them. In many of the cases the only 
possible employer (where the worker had been exposed to 
coal dust) was no longer in business or unable to pay the
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compensation. Where the workers had been employed by 
several different employers, the choice of the liable party 
often could appear to be capricious or a matter of conve 
nience, but not justice. (In a building trade such as insulation 
work, asbestos workers can work for several different 
employers within a single year!)
To overcome some of these problems, the Miller bill opts 
for a sort of superfund, financed by a tax levied on the entire 
industry from which the disease originated. This approach 
immediately encounters some immense problems. First, on 
what basis does one allocate the tax on the industry? Does 
one use current levels of employment, sales, profits? What 
criteria are employed to split these among importers, 
manufacturers, distributors, fabricators, and possibly cer 
tain users? What of firms that were formerly in the asbestos 
industry, for example, but are now no longer involved? And 
unlikely though it may be, new firms could enter the industry 
without any past history of usage, thereby having no 
reasonable probability of generating claims against the fund 
in the next few years. Are they to be absolved of the tax, and 
accordingly given a competitive edge on the industry?
Aside from the question of who, specifically, is to pay, 
there are a number of questions regarding the nature of the 
fund itself. Either a fund of this sort builds up reserves prior 
to or as future obligations develop, or it operates on a pay- 
as-you-go basis. The former approach pushes many of the 
costs onto the front end of the program and is not attractive 
to existing firms that would bear the brunt of these costs. 
The latter approach shifts some of these direct tax burdens 
into the future and could thereby shift them to other 
employers. With no basis for determining what the costs of 
an occupational disease bill will be under a pay-as-you-go 
basis, revenues would need to be adjusted frequently, 
perhaps annually, in order to avoid significant surpluses or
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shortfalls in the fund. All this implies a highly flexible 
scheme of taxation. Understandably, employers, members 
of Congress and others are loathe to provide this sort of 
discretion to set tax rates to a Secretary of Labor or any 
other political appointee, especially where the rate may not 
be made uniform in the industry, where the industry is dif 
ficult to define, and where exit and entry to the industry by 
some firms may have an immense impact on the costs borne 
by other firms therein.
The superfund approach is also not likely to be endorsed 
by those who seek to use the tax as the source of incentives to 
employers to maintain a healthy and safe workplace. So long 
as each taxed employer pays the same rate as other firms in 
that sector, there is no reason for the firm to reduce the ex 
posure to the hazard in question.
D. Exclusive Remedy Issues
Efforts to achieve reform of workers' compensation prac 
tices in cases of (occupational) disease owe much to the dif 
ficulties spilling over from the tort system. It is no coin 
cidence that those employers who have shown some will 
ingness to move toward federal reforms are those now facing 
huge costs from tort actions brought by (alleged) victims of 
occupational diseases. Their support for such change 
emanates from a realization that any options to bar further 
suits must be accompanied by the guarantee that the remain 
ing remedy, workers' compensation, be made more accessi 
ble to potential users. If such a quid pro quo were not possi 
ble, there would be no reason for those employers who sup 
port federal action to do so. Similarly, without such a 
bargain, organized labor would never willingly accept the 
principle that workers' compensation be the exclusive 
remedy in disease cases. Indeed, it will be a challenge for 
reform-minded parties to move some elements of organized
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labor to this compromise. If labor cannot be budged from its 
current public position of seeking to retain the right to sue 
third parties, however, the prospects for federal reform are 
reduced considerably.
The difficulty of achieving a compromise between labor 
and at least some employers is complicated by other factors. 
Organized labor, particularly at the state level, has never in 
vested significantly in the development of an understanding 
of the workers' compensation system. There was little ap 
parent need to do so as long as expert opinion was available 
to them, typically provided by plaintiffs' attorneys familiar 
with state practices and issues. The interests of such practi 
tioners were generally consonant with those of the unions 
and their members. On this issue, however, there is con 
siderably less overlap of mutual needs. The trial bar has no 
apparent interest in having future lawsuits by workers or sur 
vivors barred in disease cases. Any promise of a more effec 
tive workers' compensation system holds less interest for 
them than maintaining and expanding the opportunity to 
sue. If organized labor is to move towards the quid pro quo, 
they will have to do so without guidance or support from 
their traditional ally and source of expertise.
At the time of this writing, it is probably true that only a 
small proportion of U.S. employers, weighted by any 
criterion, are attracted to the quid pro quo of reforming 
workers' compensation through federal intervention, and 
being absolved of liability under tort in future occupational 
disease cases. This small group consists primarily of 
businesses involved with asbestos. There exist, however, 
firms in other industries that are very sensitive to these issues 
out of a concern that other industries will eventually be drag 
ged down by third party suits for occupational diseases. For 
a number of reasons, these firms are loathe to identify 
themselves or the basis for their interest.
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Other Needs
One of the principal shortcomings of how compensation 
systems have dealt with occupational diseases is the 
underutilization of this remedy by potential applicants. The 
problem is one that appears to be large and well identified. 
None of the potential reforms noted above bear directly on 
this issue, at least so far as underutilization has resulted from 
worker (or survivor) ignorance of their rights to compensa 
tion for diseases, or of the cause or nature of the illness. If 
this matter is not addressed in reform efforts either at the 
state or the federal level, the reforms will have relatively little 
impact on the usage people make of the system. Much more 
is known about the existence of underutilization for these 
reasons than how to ameliorate it. Perhaps that is why pro 
posed reforms regularly seem to avoid confronting the mat 
ter.
